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latter is a very  large number, this restriction will be  satisfied for realistic 
values of  y. 
Given the restrictions in (A26)-(A28),  it is easy to establish that the asset 
demands 
Casual observation and numerous empirical studies suggest that deposits are 
a normal, not an inferior, asset. Accordingly, I assume that the first positive 
term dominates the second negative term in (A31). 
8  Debt Management 
and Negotiations 
The Mexican debt began to grow rapidly in  1973 and is marked by  three 
distinct phases. Table 8.1 presents a partial decomposition of the increase in 
the debt. What is striking in the decomposition is the fact that the net resource 
transfer accompanying the debt buildup has never been large. The resource 
transfer  was  greatest  during  the  Echevem'a  administration,  but  due  to 
large-scale capital flight in 1975 and 1976, the cumulative noninterest current 
account deficit totalled less  than  half  of  the  increase in  the  debt.  In  the 
subsequent  Lopez  Portillo  administration,  the  net  resource  transfer  was 
negligible.  Almost  all  new  borrowing  served to  finance  capital  flight or 
interest payments on previously contracted debt; the cumulative noninterest 
current account deficit accounted for only 5 percent of the debt accumulated 
between  1977 and  1982. After  1982 the  direction of  resource flows was 
reversed and Mexico made large net  transfers abroad.  The De  La Madrid 
administration ran the huge trade balance surpluses required to make interest 
payments on the debt. Unsettlingly, however, the current account registered a 
cumulative surplus of $9.6 billion from 1983 to 1986, even as the total debt 518  Edward F.  Buffie 
lsble 8.1  Debt Decomposition (billion $) 
Current Account Deficit 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Interest“  Noninterest  Increase in Debtb  W(3) 
1971-76  6.00  8.81  20.07  .44 
1977-82  31.63  3.52  67.26  .05 
1983-86  34.98  -44.60  5.91  - 
Sources: The  decomposition of  the  current account deficit into its  interest and  noninterest components is 
calculated using data from Indicadores Economicos (Bank  of Mexico). For reasons mentioned in chapter 4, 
Zedillo’s figures (1987, 177) are used for the increase in the external debt. 
“Private and  public  sector  interest  payments  on  the  foreign  debt  plus  remitted  profits less  income  from 
Mexican investments abroad. 
’Net  increase in private and public sector foreign debt plus net foreign direct investment. 
increased $5.9 billion. Part of the surplus reflected a substantial accumulation 
of reserves in  1983 and 1984, but much of it underwrote further capital flight. 
In  different  periods,  capital  flight  has  been  motivated  by  a  heavily 
overvalued exchange rate. The absence of  capital inflows after devaluation 
of  the  currency of  realistic  levels,  however,  indicates that  the  perceived 
relative return on domestic assets must have declined. This seems to reflect 
the operation of  several factors. First, the return on domestic assets may be 
discounted by an “appropriation risk”  factor; it is undoubtedly the case that 
part of  the private sector fears the government may resort to drastic wealth 
levies  (tax  increases  or  partial  wealth  seizures,  as  with  the  Mexdollar 
accounts in 1982) to service the external debt. Second, real interest rates on 
bank  deposits-the  main  saving  instrument  for  the  noncorporate private 
sector-were  low or negative between  1973 and  1985. In  1986, high real 
deposit  rates  emerged.  The  high  rates  along  with  a  severe reduction  in 
private sector credit (forcing “distress borrowing”)  finally generated a small 
capital inflow, but  1987 brought renewed capital flight. 
8.1  Institutions Relating to Debt Management: The Public 
Sector Debt 
The branches of the Mexican government in charge of external debt policy 
are the Ministry of  Finance (Secretaria de Hacienda y Credit0 Publico, or 
SHCP) and the Bank of  Mexico. Within Hacienda, the Director General of 
Credit  (DGC) has  handled  most  issues relating to debt management. The 
DGC and the Bank of  Mexico are responsible for formulating debt policy, 
authorizing  new  loans,  keeping  records  on  all  loan  transactions,  and 
negotiating debt reschedulings. 
One of the first steps taken by Lopez Portillo as president was to regulate 
the process by  which foreign debt was contracted. On 31 December 1976, 
the  General  Law  of  Public  Debt  (Ley  General  de  Deuda  Publica)  was 519  Mexico/Chapter 8 
enacted. This law established the rules and regulations that were to govern 
the acquisition of  foreign debt by  the public sector. Hacienda was put  in 
charge of  contracting all debt for the federal government. Borrowing by  the 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) required  prior  approval  by  Hacienda. To 
obtain approval, the SOEs had to submit their budgets and investment plans 
to Hacienda. In addition to these responsibilities, Hacienda was assigned the 
task of  collecting all information pertaining to the  financial terms of  the 
external debt (maturity, interest payments, amortization schedules, etc.). As 
a final control measure, the General Law stipulated that the yearly budget of 
the federal government include ceilings on external borrowing. 
Although a large fraction of  the foreign borrowing was  done by  SOEs 
(most notably PEMEX, NAFINSA  [development bank], TELMEX [phone 
company],  SIDERMEX  [steel mills],  and  BANPESCA  [fisheries bank]), 
Hacienda and the Bank of  Mexico proved fairly adept at staying informed 
about the debt buildup. A comparison of the (now known) actual value of the 
public sector debt in  1980 and 1981 with the figures published by  NAFINSA 
for those two years does not show large discrepancies (table 8.2). 
In contrast to the public sector debt, little effort was made to keep track of 
the private sector foreign debt. Prior to 1983, the Mexican authorities did not 
require any type of registration of private sector debt (Gurria Trevifio 1987, 
24). The major problem in the debt management process, however, was not 
the lack of  good information but rather the absence of  a well-defined debt 
strategy. No single agency in the government had primary responsibility for 
monitoring the current account deficit and judging whether the pace of debt 
accumulation  was  excessive.  The  Ministries  of  Commerce,  Finance, 
Planning, and  Foreign Affairs all made separate estimates of  the country’s 
“capacity to pay.”  The various forecasts were usually  in  conflict.  In  the 
pivotal year 198  1, Hacienda repeatedly warned that a softening in the world 
oil market was on the horizon. This counsel was emphatically rejected, and 
government  policy  was  instead  formulated  on  the  basis  of  the  more 
comforting forecast that the world market price of oil would average $55 per 
barrel for the second half of  1982.’ 
Nor did the foreign banks exercise much critical judgement. Regarded as a 
safe client because  of  its  oil  wealth,  the  Mexican  government was  long 
encouraged to borrow on the implicit understanding that its medium-term 
debts (three- to seven-year loans) would be automatically refinanced (Gurria 
Table 8.2  The Public and Publicly Gnaranteed Long-Term  Debt (billion $) 
Year  NAFINSA (1981)  World Bank (1985) 
1980  36.9 
1981  47.8 
38.9 
47.4 
Sources:  The  World Bank and NMINSA. 520  Edward F.  Buffie 
Trevino  1987,  13). Syndicated loans  for  numerous  projects  of  extremely 
dubious merit,  such as those that  financed construction  of  the state-owned 
steel mills of SICARTSA, were often oversubscribed.2 Even after mid-1981, 
when  Mexico  was  clearly  headed  for  tr~uble,~  short-term  credits  could 
usually be arranged on the basis of just a promissory note or a tested telex 
(Gunia Trevino 1987, 14). In the general rush to lend, Mexican loans became 
a significant part of many banks’ portfolios. Table 8.3 shows exposure as a 
percentage of primary capital in 1982 for eighteen U.S. banks. In several of 
the  largest  banks,  exposure  exceeded  50  percent.  A  large  number  of 
European  (notably the  Swiss  Bank  Corporation) and  Japanese banks  also 
participated in the lending spree and became heavily exposed. 
Summing up, the changes instituted under the General Law of Public Debt 
did not improve control over external borrowing. The law may actually have 
contributed to Mexico’s debt management problems insofar as foreign banks 
viewed  Hacienda  as guaranteeing  repayment  of  their  loans  to  the  SOEs, 
regardless of the profitability of  the projects financed by those loans. 
8.2  The Debt Negotiations 
A few months before the crisis became known  to the world  at  large  in 
August  1982, Jesus Silva Herzog, the Minister of  Finance, commissioned a 
small task force to quantify the total debt of the public sector and to draw up 
a debt rescheduling  proposal  for submission to the country’s creditors.  In 
July, Silva started negotiations with the IMF in the hope of having a Fund 
agreement in hand before approaching the banks. The negotiations, however, 
did not progress quickly enough and, on 23 August  1982, Silva announced 
Table 8.3  U.S. Bank Exposure, 1982 (% of primary capital) 
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Source:  Institute for International Finance (Washington, D.C.) 521  Mexico/Chapter 8 
that  Mexico  would  suspend all  payments  of  principal for  the  next  three 
months. In the days that followed, tense negotiations took place between the 
Mexican  authorities  and  the  banks  under  the  auspices  of  the  Federal 
Re~erve.~  The Mexican proposal to the banks called for 
Postponement of  amortization payments  until  31  December  1984  ($20 
$5 billion of  new financing. 
All loans to carry an interest rate of  1.75 points over prime or 1.875 points 
over LIBOR. 
The  banks  formed  an  advisory  committee  with  William  Rhodes  of 
Citibank  serving  as  chairman.  On  15  December  1982,  a  rescheduling 
agreement was reached with more than 1,000 of the 1,400 banks involved in 
the negotiations. For the $20 billion of capital payments coming due between 
23 August 1982 and 31  December 1984, the following terms were settled on 
(from SHCP): 
Rescheduling fee: 1 percent. 
Interest rates:  1.875 over prime or 1.75 over LIBOR. 
Maturity: Eight years with a four-year grace period. 
For the new loan of $5 billion, the terms were: 
Fee:  1.25 percent. 
Interest rates: 2.125 over prime or 2.25 over LIBOR. 
Maturity: Six years with a three-year grace period. 
The  new  $5  billion  loan  increased  the  participating  banks’  exposure 
approximately 7 percent.  Each bank’s  contribution was  determined by  its 
share in  total  claims on the country as of  August  1982. In  exchange for 
keeping open the possibility of  further reschedulings and for the four-year 
grace period given on the $20 billion of rescheduled debt, the banks obtained 
very high rates and commissions. 
The impact of  the 1982 restructuring on the amortization schedule for the 
public  sector foreign debt is shown in table 8.4. The restructuring bought 
two years of relief, but at the price of  a much more oppressive repayments 
schedule beginning in  1985. 
The  1982 restructuring was followed in  1983 by  new  agreements more 
favorable to Mexico.’  A $4.5 billion PEMEX acceptances facility was re- 
newed in midyear for an additional two years. In December, the commercial 
banks agreed to make a new loan of $3.8 billion to the Mexican government. 
Again, individual bank participation was on the basis of pro rata exposure as 
of  August 1982. The new loan carried far easier terms than the new money 
package of  1982. The interest rate was either  1.5 percent over LIBOR or 
1.125 percent over the U.S. prime (at the election of the creditor), and the 
loan’s  maturity  was  set  at  ten  years  with  a  five-and-one-half-year grace 
period. Commitment and facility fees were also comparatively low. 
billion). 522  Edward F.  Buffie 
lsble 8.4  ProlUe of Capital Payments  on the  Public Sector Debt Before and After 1982 
Rescbeduling (billion $) 
Year  Before  After 
1982  8.14  .58 
1983  8.96  1.47 
1984  5.37  1.66 
1985  9.67  10.17 
1986  5.15  8.50 
1987  7.53  13.73 
1988  4.67  10.78 
1989  3.52  9.13 
1990  1.13  9.09 
After  1990  3.16  5.33 
Source:  Notas Sobre la Reestructuracion de la Deuda Exter~  de Mexico (SHCP). 
The  1982  and  1983  agreements  staved  off  an  immediate  crisis,  but 
accomplished little more.  Despite the  reschedulings and  the  new  money, 
Mexico made a large net transfer to its creditors in 1983 and 1984 of $14.7 
billion.6  Furthermore,  adherence  to  the  maturity  schedule  entailed  a 
staggering $69 billion of repayments over the next five years (see table 8.6 
below). 
Confronted  with  a  repayments  schedule that  presaged  macroeconomic 
collapse,  the  Mexican  authorities began  to  press  for  a  more  extensive, 
multiyear restructuring package. The banks’ negotiating committee refused 
to discuss  such  a package for nearly  six months  and  then  in  June  1984 
allowed  that  it  might  be  possible  to  reschedule  payments  coming  due 
between  1985 and  1987. The Mexican team  insisted  that  a  longer  term 
rescheduling was necessary, and  after prolonged, intense negotiations, the 
restructuring  package  detailed in  table  8.5 was  agreed  upon  in  the  last 
quarter of  1984.7 Five billion dollars of  new money was provided, and all 
public sector payments on principal coming due between 31 December 1984 
and 31 December 1989 were rescheduled to be paid over a period of fourteen 
years with a two-year grace period. Of the $43 billion of  rescheduled debt, 
$23 billion  had  been  rescheduled before, just  after the  1982 crisis.  The 
lsble 8.5  The 1984-85  Restructuring 
$43 billion rescheduled ($20 billion not yet rescheduled and $23 billion previously 
rescheduled and coming due for payment): 
Interest rates:  .875 over LIBOR for the first two years; 
1.125 over LIBOR for the next five years; 
1.25 over LIBOR for the last seven years 
14 years with a 2-year  grace period 
1.5 over LIBOR or 1.125 over prime 
Maturity: 
$5  billion of  new financing: 
Interest rates: 
Maturity:  10 years with a 5-year grace period for $4 billion; 
prepayment of  $1 billion 523  MexicoIChapter 8 
interest rate on the restructured debt was cut roughly one percentage point, 
and LIBOR replaced the prime rate as the reference rate on most of the debt. 
Table 8.6 shows how the restructuring of both the commercial and official 
debt altered the profile of future capital payments. Over $40 billion corning 
due in the last half of  the eighties was rescheduled to be paid between 1991 
and 1998. 
In addition to renegotiating the maturity and  interest rate,  the currency 
denomination of  part  of  the  debt  was  diversified. Non-U.S.  banks  were 
offered the option of converting a portion of their dollar debt into their own 
national currency. If  30 percent or less of  the total debt was earmarked for 
redenomination,  the  conversion  would  be  effected  in  equal  monthly 
installments over a period of two years at the then prevailing exchange rate. 
For  redenomination of  40 percent of  the debt, the conversion period was 
thirty  months,  and  for  redenomination  of  50  percent  (the  maximum 
allowed), it was lengthened to forty-two months. In all, $12.2 billion of the 
public sector debt was made eligible for redenomination. Table 8.7 indicates 
how  the  currency composition  of  the  debt  has  changed  since  1982. In 
practice,  redenomination has  been  very  limited.  As  of  December  1985, 
dollar-denominated debt still claimed 90 percent of  the total public sector 
external debt. 
The catastrophic decline in world oil prices in early 1986 forced Mexico to 
seek new credit and a further restructuring of its debt. On 22 July 1986, the 
'Igble 8.6  Prome of Capital Payments on the Public and  Private seetor Debt  Before and 

















Before  After 
Total  Public  Privateb  Total  Public  Private 
13.32  10.92  2.40 
10.83  9.43  1.40  7.66  4.95  2.71 
14.81  13.76  1.05  1.42  6.12  1.30 
15.71  12.48  3.23  6.57  3.38  3.19 
14.10  10.55  3.55  7.84  4.95  2.89 
11.04  8.46  2.58  8.05  5.51  2.54 
4.87  2.20  2.67  8.80  6.20  2.60 
2.65  1.87  .78  7.03  6.18  .85 
2.05  1.08  .97  7.18  6.25  .92 
.86  .69  .I7  6.43  6.34  .09 
.45  .28  .14  6.49  6.13  .36 
.38  .25  .13  6.25  6.23  .02 
.26  .26  0  6.58  6.58  0 
.22  .22  0  6.48  6.48  0 
5.04  5.04  0  45.51  45.51  0 
-  -  - 
Source: Dmcion General de Credit0 Publico. 
'Repurchases  of  IMF  debt  are  calculated under  the  assumption  of  full  utilization of  the  Extended Fund 
Facility. 
bAmortization schedule as of  31 December 1984. 524  Edward F.  Buffie 
Table 8.7  Currency Composition of the Total Public Sector Debt (end-of-year, million $) 
Currency  1982  1983  1984  1985 
Austrian Schillings  n.a.  26  18 
Canadian Dollars  n.a.  355  606 
Deutsche Marks  1,561  1,412  1,170 
Dutch Guilders  n.a.  1  24  1 I9 
ECUs  0  0  0 
French Francs  n.a.  546  403 
Italian Lire  n.a.  15  58 
Japanese Yen  794  827  1,388 
Pounds Sterling  1,002  1,007  659 
Swiss Francs  690  480  475 
U.S. Dollars  53,483  57,397  63,917 
Belgian Francs  n.a.  46  100 










92  1 
640 
64,670 
Mexican government presented a Letter of  Intent to the IMF, outlining the 
terms of  an eighteen-month standby agreement, and approached the World 
Bank for a new loan. In August a $1.1 billion bridge loan was arranged with 
the  Bank  for  International Settlements,  eleven  OECD countries,  and  the 
central banks of four Latin American countries. 
The  World  Bank  loan  provided  $2.3  billion  in  net  financing  to  be 
disbursed over 1986-87.  To qualify for the loan, Mexico agreed to continue 
the privatization of  some state enterprises (those defined as “nonstrategic” 
by  the  government),  to  promote foreign  investment,  and  to  increase the 
scope of  trade liberalization. All  of  these initiatives were inspired by  the 
Baker Plan.8 
Further in the spirit of the Baker Plan, the Mexican Letter of  Intent called 
for new  external finance to  support structural reform  and growth-oriented 
adjustment.  The  standby  facility  itself  provided  $1.4  billion  in  Special 
Drawing Rights to be doled out in seven installments between  1 November 
1986 and  1 April 1988. The IMF approved the Mexican plan conditional on 
90  percent of  the commercial banks involved agreeing to participate.  The 
banks, in turn, made their commitment conditional on Mexico’s meeting the 
IMF’s macroeconomic targets,  the approval of  certain World  Bank  loans, 
and the disbursement of  a minimum amount of  funds from the World Bank 
($1.7  billion) and  bilateral  sources (Gunia  Treviiio  1987, 48-49).  After 
more than four months of negotiations, on 20 March 1987 an agreement was 
finally  struck  with  the  banks  entailing  $6  billion  of  new  money  and 
rescheduling of $52.3 billion of  existing debt (table 8.8). 
The program also included three innovative contingency clauses. The first, 
with the IMF, provides an additional $600 million in the event that the world 
market price of  oil drops below  $9 per barrel. The other two contingency 
clauses are with the commercial banks and link a $500 million loan to the 525  Mexico/Chapter 8 
Table 8.8  The 1986 Restructuring 
A. 
B.  New loan ($6 billion): 
C. 
Debt contracted prior to  1982 ($43.7 billion): 
Rescheduled with a maturity of 20 years and a grace period of  7 years 
Maturity of  12 years with a 5-year grace period 
Debt contracted in  1983 and  1984 ($8.6 billion): 
Rescheduled with a maturity of  8 years and a grace period of 4 years 
Interest rates: U.S. Prime completely eliminated as a reference rate and all interest 
rates set at LIBOR plus ,8125 
D. 
economy's growth performance and a $1.2 billion loan for public investment 
to inadequate growth of export revenues. 
In addition to restructuring the commercial bank debt, the Paris Club debt 
was rescheduled. All payments on principal coming due between 22 Septem- 
ber  1986  and  31  March  1988  ($1.5  billion)  and  60  percent  of  interest 
payments due between 22 September 1986 and  31  December  1987 ($282 
million) were consolidated and scheduled for repayment over ten years. The 
new  agreement includes a five-year grace period that effectively defers the 
first set of payments to  1 January 1992.' 
The impact of the commercial bank and Paris Club debt restructurings on 
the total amortization schedule is shown in table 8.9. Capital payments for 
Table 8.9  Profile of Capital Payments on the Public and Private Sector Debt Before and 
After the 1986 Rescheduling (billion $)" 
Before  After 
Year  Total  Public  Private  Total  Public  Privateb 
1986  7.66  4.95  2.71  3.61  2.07  1.54 
I987  7.42  6.12  1.30  5.83  3.74  2.10 
1988  6.57  3.38  3.19  6.48  3.30  3.19 
1989  7.84  4.95  2.89  6.35  3.46  2.89 
I990  8.05  5.51  2.54  7.33  4.79  2.54 
1991  8.80  6.20  2.60  7.22  4.62  2.60 
1992  7.03  6.18  .85  4.23  3.38  2.5 
1993  7.18  6.25  .92  3.87  2.95  .92 
1994  6.43  6.34  .w  2.63  2.54  .w 
1995  6.49  6.13  .36  2.01  1.65  .36 
1996  6.25  6.23  .02  3.11  3.09  .02 
1997  6.58  6.58  0  2.41  2.41  0 
1998  6.48  6.48  0  3.06  3.06  0 
After 1998  4.55  4.55  0  40.85  40.85  0 
Source:  Direccion General de Credit0 Publico. 
"Repurchases of  IMF debt  are calculated under  the  assumption  of  full utilization  of  the  Extended  Fund 
Facility. 
bBased on revised estimates of  the private sector debt which reflect repayments made  in  1985, Paris Club 
restructurings, and reclassification of  data. 526  Edward F.  Buffie 
1986-89  have been lowered only $7.2 billion. Most of the adjustment comes 
in moving back payments originally due in the nineties. The new financing 
package lowers capital payments over the 1990-98  period by  $27.4 billion. 
Recently, the government has experimented with different mechanisms to 
reduce the  debt  burden.  Since  1986, $2.3 billion of  bank  debt has  been 
liquidated via  debt-equity  swaps.  A  debt  securitization scheme (with the 
discount tied to the country’s performance) proposed by  Drexel, Burnham, 
and Lambert is also under consideration, but so far no move has been made 
in this direction. 
8.3  Private Debt 
Only a couple of the largest Mexican firms contracted credit directly with 
foreign lenders. Prior to  1982, most of  the debt contracted by  the private 
sector was arranged with banks which acted as intermediaries. A Mexican 
bank would obtain a loan from a foreign syndicate and then, under a different 
contract,  lend  the  borrowed  amount  less  a  commission  to  some  private 
company.  The  most  important  intermediaries  were  Nacional  Financiera 
(NAFINSA) and the Banco Nacional de Cornercio Exterior (BANCOMEXT) 
among  the  government  banks  (Banca  de  Desarrollo)  and  BANCOMER, 
BANAMEX,  and COMERMEX among the privately owned banks. All of 
these banks had agencies in New York (and some in London and Tokyo) to tap 
the capital market. According to NAFINSA, some credits were arranged in 
less than an hour. 
Firms were frequently used as a vehicle for capital flight. After obtaining 
a  dollar-denominated loan,  industrialists would  deposit the  loan  proceeds 
abroad. This practice became widespread as the general expectation arose 
that the government would first devalue and then bail out firms with large 
dollar debts who faced severe liquidity problems. 
Data on the private external debt are scarce and of poor quality. The World 
Bank figures seem to be underestimates since they frequently omit debt held 
with suppliers. The best data available, inaccurate as they are, come from the 
Bank of Mexico (table 8.10). 
After nationalizing the private banks in September 1982, the government, 
in effect, he€d almost 100 percent of the private sector external debt. The de 
facto nationalization of the private debt occurred at the same time that massive 
devaluations created serious cash flow  problems for many  companies that 
were heavily indebted in dollars (i.e., those companies that were not merely 
a front for capital flight) but not exporting.  To  aid  such firms, a financial 
scheme providing coverage of foreign exchange risk, FICORCA (Fideicomiso 
Para  la  Cobertura  de  Riesgo Cambiarios),  was  introduced.  FICORCA  is 
administered by the Bank of  Mexico and works as follows: 
Any private company having dollar- (or any foreign currency) denominated 
debt can participate, provided it registers its debt with the Bank of Mexico 527  Mexico/Chapter 8 
Table 8.10  Private Sector Long-Term Debt (billion $) 
Year  Total  FICORCA  Paris Club  Other 
1975  4.9  -  4.9 
1976  5.5  -  5.5 
5.4  1977  5.4 
5.5  1978  5.5 
7.2  1979  7.2 
-  11.0  1980  11.0  - 
-  14.9  1981  14.9  - 
-  20.0  1982  20.0  - 
9.1  1983  20.6  11.5  - 
1984  18.8  11.9  .I  6.8 
1985  17.6  11.0  .3  6.3 
1986  17.0  10.6  .3  6.2 
- 
- 
-  - 
-  - 
-  - 
Source:  Bank of  Mexico. 
FICORCA  grants a loan  in  pesos which  is equal in  value to the  dollar 
amount the firm has borrowed. The participating firm gives its dollars to 
the Bank of Mexico, and the equivalent peso loan is calculated using the 
value of  the controlled exchange rate on the day the company signs into 
FICORCA.  FICORCA  then  services the  debt  on  a quarterly basis only 
after the  company makes its  required  payment  in  pesos to  the  Central 
Bank. 
The firm’s peso payments are scheduled so as to be constant throughout 
the life of  the contract (i.e., payments increase in  nominal  terms since 
inflation is high). Thus, in the first years of the contract, FICORCA grants 
a subsidy. In later years, payments exceed interest charges and the subsidy 
is recovered.  As  long  as  the domestic interest rate  is  maintained  at  its 
parity level (i.e., the foreign interest rate plus the percentage depreciation 
of the peso), the scheme has a net present value of  zero. 
FICORCA does not involve the government in negotiating rescheduling 
of  private  sector  debt.  Each  participating  firm  is  responsible  for 
renegotiating its own debt. To  qualify for admission into FICORCA, the 
interest rate on the firm’s debt must be LIBOR plus two points or lower 
and the maturity of  the debt must be eight years and include a four-year 
grace period. 
FICORCA does not cover commercial risk. If  a company goes bankrupt or 
for any reason falls behind schedule in its peso payments to FICORCA, the 
Bank of  Mexico will not continue to service the company’s dollar debt. 
Under the same conditions that apply to private sector firms, SIDERMEX 
(steel mills),  BANPESCA  (fisheries bank),  and  BANCOMEXT  (foreign 
trade bank) can participate in FICORCA. 
By  October 1983 (the deadline for enrollment in the facility), FICORCA 
covered 1,121 firms holding 55 percent of  the total private sector debt ($12 
billion). The scheme has  benefitted  mostly  large firms. Eighty percent of 528  Edward F.  Buffie 
FICORCA debt is held by  13.4 percent of  the firms. The fifty largest firms 
alone account for 57 percent of the total debt. 
The FICORCA  facility  probably  prevented  a  chain  of  bankruptcies  in 
1982. The major risk  is that  the facility  will become a fiscal drain.  If  the 
domestic  interest  rate  drops  below  its  parity  level,  FICORCA  grants  a 
permanent subsidy to the indebted companies. So far, this has not happened. 
Between April  1983 and April  1987, FICORCA generated net revenues for 
the government. 
Two  large,  well-known  Mexican  companies,  Alfa  and  Moctezuma, 
defaulted  and  withdrew  from  FICORCA  until  they  could  work  out  a 
restructuring  agreement with their creditors.  In both cases, the banks took 
some losses. The Alfa group’s debt was $2.6 billion, of which $900 million 
belonged to the holding company while the remainder represented liabilities 
of HYLSA, its steel company. A steering committee was formed by Bank of 
America, Chase Manhattan, Citibank, and Morgan Guaranty. The restructur- 
ing of the holding company’s debt involved a cash payment of $25 million, 
conversion of $200 million into peso-denominated  debt, and a swap of  the 
remaining  debt  for  equity.  Mexican  shareholders have  a  priority  right  to 
acquire any stock the banks sell. 
Moctezuma, one of the nation’s largest breweries, obtained an even better 
deal. Its $307 million debt was rescheduled to be repaid over fourteen years 
with  a  six-year  grace period.  The interest  rate  on half  of  the  debt  ($154 
million) is fixed at 3 percent, while for the other half the rate is LIBOR  + 
0.25 percent.  Interest accumulated during the two years of negotiations was 
also forgiven. 
9  Future Prospects: Is There 
A Way Out? 
At the time of this writing (early 1988), prospects for the Mexican economy 
appear very  dim. After  achieving  small but positive per capita growth  in 
1984 and  1985, the economy was  sent reeling by the sharp drop in world 
market oil prices in  1986. The De La Madrid administration reacted to the 
oil shock by dispensing a stronger dose of austerity. Real fiscal spending was 
reduced slightly, and real credit to the private sector cut 9.6 percent. To limit 
the deterioration in the payments balance, the rate of depreciation of the peso 
was raised substantially, culminating in  a huge 32 percent  real devaluation 
by  the end of  the year.  These policies,  in conjunction with the fall  in oil 
prices, resulted in triple-digit inflation (105.7 percent) and a decline in real 